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Abstract—NASA, as an organization, takes risk management 
(RM) seriously, and for most projects, the risk management 
process is exemplar. There can be challenges, though, with 
defining RM processes. For example, many different risk 
analysis methodologies are available, they can be applied with 
varying degrees of rigor, and they can have different value 
depending on how projects use them. In particular, risk analysis 
methodologies vary considerably in the level of quantitative 
detail, with more probabilistic techniques encouraged in some 
situations. We discussed these processes and methodologies with 
ten project managers (PM) at the NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center (GSFC). Our intent was not to prove with some level of 
statistical significance that some are more helpful than others, 
but rather to obtain a general understanding of how projects are 
identifying, and thinking, about risks. This paper describes 
some of the available risk processes and methodologies, and 
provides some insights about the benefits that can gained from 
their use. We provide an in-depth discussion of one quantitative 
methodology, Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRAs), and 
conclude with a few insights from observed best practices. 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
NASA has developed requirements, procedures, and process 
guidelines to establish, implement, and manage effective risk 
management processes [1,2]. The guidelines, however, leave 
much of the details of the process implementation to 
individual project managers to determine (e.g., how often risk 
lists are updated, etc.); a significant aspect of this is that 
different project managers will approach risk management 
processes with different degrees of rigor and vigilance. For 
example, an interesting observation from Dillon, Klein, 
Rogers, and Scolese [3] is how widely projects vary in their 
risk management process execution. Variation in project size 
is a reasonable factor contributing to variation in risk 
management methodologies and processes; Table 1 
illustrates this by showing the number of unique risks 
documented in the GSFC Flight Projects Directorate (FPD) 
Cross-Cutting Risk Framework database between July 2015 
and July 2017. Focusing on only the Class B projects in Phase 
D, of which there were seven, the number of risks 
documented in the two year period for each project were 2, 4, 
17, 21, 26, 65, and 121. While there is not a “correct” number 
of risks for a project to identify (and the authors acknowledge 
that the identification of risks depends on many specific 
project factors), the variance between 2 and 121 is certainly 
worth noting. It certainly appeared to the authors that the 
degree of rigor applied to the risk management process from 
project to project was more diverse than anticipated.  
 
Table 1 – Unique Risks Documented in Cross Cutting 
Risk Framework Database by Project [3] 
Project 
ID 
Number of 
unique risks  
Project size and project 
phase between 7/15- 7/17 
1 21 Class B, Phase D 
2 14 Class A, Phases C & D 
4 2 Class B, Phase D 
5 77 Class B, Phases B & C 
6 26 Class B, Phase D 
7 17 Class B, Phase D 
8 4 Class B, Phase D 
9 47 Class B, Phase N/A 
12 6 Class N/A, Phase N/A 
13 121 Class B, Phase D 
15 26 Class C, Phase C 
16 3 Class N/A, Phase N/A 
17 65 Class B, Phase D 
19 33 Class C, Phase D 
20 80 Class B, Phase B 
21 11 Class B, Phases B & C 
22 32 Class C, Phase C 
24 3 Class N/A, Phase N/A 
25 33 Class C, Phase D 
26 44 Class C, Phase C 
27 11 Class N/A, Phase N/A 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20190001306 2019-08-30T10:49:23+00:00Z
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It appeared that some project managers find risk management 
processes extremely valuable, and others find the process less 
helpful, thus only minimally implementing the process to 
meet risk process requirements (“check off a box”). Many 
situations could have occurred to unintentionally reinforce a 
project manager’s negativity toward the risk management 
process. For example, PMs could have experienced the 
following on previous projects: 
 Low-probability, high-consequence events that were 
nearly impossible to predict (“Black Swans”) and were 
thus not identified by the risk management process, 
leaving the impression that the RM process is not an 
effective method of preventing problems.  
 Risk management process investment outweighed the 
expected return. Some reasons could include: 
o Too bureaucratic or complicated to be efficient or 
helpful to the project 
o Risk analysis tasks that took too long and thus 
delayed other project activities. 
o Too many risks were identified, and thus too much 
noise and busy work attached to the risk 
management process, resulting in a lack of focus 
on the most important (“real”) risks. 
 
For the undetected, undesirable, events, adopting systematic 
risk management processes (while not perfect), should reduce 
the likelihood of such events occurring on future projects. As 
Paté-Cornell [4, p. 1828] states “Risk analysis is thus an 
alternative to the ‘stuff happens’ philosophy – ignoring 
signals and deciding that accidents are ‘normal’ events or are 
too unlikely to be accounted for.” But as is emphasized in the 
NASA risk guidelines [1,2], and in most best practice 
recommendations for risk management, the amount of effort 
expended in a RM process should depend on the value of the 
mission. The more expensive the mission, the more 
warranted are increased investments in rigorous risk 
management processes to seek out small probability, high 
consequence events.  
 
In the second case, where one’s experience is with poorly-
implemented RM processes, the insights and suggestions 
described here should help future projects balance the costs 
of an effective, efficient, risk management process against its 
benefits. 
 
 
2. THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
RISKS AND ESCALATION OF COMMITMENT 
Decades of academic research have examined the effect of 
risks on decision-making behavior. Generally, the conclusion 
is that the relationship between risks and decision making is 
complicated by many different contributing factors. For 
example, some studies [5] find that individuals with past 
successes will be risk-averse in future decision making (to 
protect prior gains), and others [6] find decision-makers, with 
past successes, will take more risks based on confidence from 
prior successes. We are particularly concerned about the 
linkages between risks, risk management processes, and 
escalation of commitment decisions.  
 
The escalation-of-commitment “bias” refers to the tendency 
of people, in the face of negative consequences, to increase 
resource commitment, and risk further losses [7,8]. This 
tendency makes risks, and escalation of commitment, 
explicitly linked. If projects do not have significant issues 
arise (i.e., realized risks), they would not need to escalate 
commitment. 
  
A consistent finding in project management is that, as 
projects approach their final stages, strong desires for 
completion (and at NASA, strong needs for project success) 
affect resource allocation decisions; while at earlier project 
stages, risks can have a more significant role in influencing 
resource-allocation decisions [8]. This shifting focus across a 
project’s timeline becomes a challenge for projects, 
especially for the projects with smaller budgets. Table 2 
describes the characteristics of project classes from NPR 
8705.4 NASA Procedural Requirements, Appendix D [9]. 
The implication of deeming a project as a Class C or D, 
should allow more risk tradeoffs to be made on the project. 
At earlier stages in the project, when risks are influencing 
allocation decisions, this may be true, but as projects 
approach the final life cycle stages, the need for completion, 
and the strong desire for success, tend to overtake a 
willingness to take risks. At a recent GSFC Masters Forum, 
a common concern raised by many was that despite initial 
risk-based decisions made in the project life cycle, “on the 
pad, every project is Class A.” This effect can easily 
contribute to inconsistent decisions regarding risk across 
different project phases, and an unwarranted escalation of 
commitment in late phases when unanticipated problems 
arise.  
 
Table 2 – Some Classification Considerations for NASA 
Class A-D Payloads [9, Appendix B] 
 Class A Class B Class C Class D 
Agency 
Priority 
High High Medium  Low  
National 
significance 
Very 
high 
High Medium Low to 
medium 
Mission 
Lifetime 
Long  
> 5 yrs 
Medium 
2-5 yrs 
Short  
< 2 yrs 
Short  
< 2 yrs 
Cost High High to 
medium 
Medium 
to low 
Low 
Alternative 
Opportunities 
for Science 
Collection/ 
Reflight 
None Few  Some  Many 
 
Additionally, academic research indicates that if problems 
were identified in advance by the risk management process, 
and thus were “expected to occur”, this encourages project 
managers to continue with the project even if it means an 
escalation of commitment because the project is perceived to 
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be “on-track” [10]. The implication is that if projects do a 
sufficient job identifying critical risks, then when problems 
arise that were linked to identified risks, project managers 
may be convinced that the project is proceeding well, despite 
the remaining significant challenges. This is where a 
minimalist RM process, that identifies risks, but only does a 
cursory job understanding the implications and mitigation 
actions for the risks, would be less helpful than a risk 
management process that fully details, tracks, and effectively 
mitigates these risks. A minimalist risk process that 
identifies, but does not thoroughly characterize the risks may 
reinforce an unjustified escalation of commitment.  
 
We next describe multiple methodologies and processes that 
can contribute to an effective RM process, and explore the 
value of different degrees of rigor. 
 
3. COMMONLY USED RISK PROCESSES AND 
METHODOLOGIES 
As part of the GSFC-specific Risk Management Training 
course at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center [11], 
students are instructed on many topics including the NASA 
Continuous Risk Management (CRM) process steps. The first 
step in CRM is “Identify the risks”, and the students are 
encouraged to recognize that risks can come from many 
sources. The other steps are: Analyze, Plan, Track, Control, 
and Document & Communicate. The course also provides a 
list of some useful sources for identifying risks. Here are the 
thirteen areas highlighted in the course as potential sources 
for identifying risks: 
Trade studies – an activity used to identify the preferred 
technical solution among a set of alternatives. Trade studies 
should document the decision making process to enable 
traceability and repeatability. There are numerous techniques 
that can be applied to conduct a trade study, and like most 
risk analysis methodologies, trade studies need to be tailored 
to the specific problem circumstances. Risks associated with 
project tradeoffs should be identified and entered into the 
project “risk register.” 
Safety/Hazard analysis – an activity used to identify hazards 
that may arise on the project, or be caused by the project; the 
goal of a safety/hazard analysis is to reduce these risks. The 
safety/hazard analysis should document the potential 
negative consequences that could occur while examining the 
potential causes of such consequences, documenting the 
hazards and the probability that these hazards could occur. 
The method of safety/hazard analysis, and reliability 
analysis, may overlap (e.g., a Failure Mode and Effect 
Analysis could be used for either purpose). 
Independent project reviews – a review involving unbiased, 
external experts, often conducted at major project milestones, 
to assess a project’s progress and evaluate a team’s ability to 
meet mission objectives. These outside experts often identify 
new risks for the project during the course of the review. 
Technical Peer Reviews – a review involving a team of peers, 
not directly involved with the project, who have the subject 
matter expertise pertaining to the topic being reviewed. Risks 
are often identified in the course of the review, frequently 
from problems that cannot be resolved during the technical 
peer review. 
Reliability analysis – an activity used to examine ways the 
project, or system, can fail. For our purposes, we discuss non-
probabilistic methodologies separate from probabilistic risk 
assessments. A common reliability analysis methodology 
(that may also be used in safety/hazard analyses) is a Failure 
Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA). The FMEA is an 
inductive analysis that systematically details, on a 
component-by-component basis, all possible failure modes, 
and identifies their resulting effects on the entire system. 
Possible single-failure modes of each component in a system 
are identified and analyzed to determine the effect on 
surrounding components, as well as the entire system. Most 
FMEAs also include a component criticality score, and one 
of the most common methods is to assign a Risk Priority 
Number (RPN) to the possible failure of a specific 
component.  
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) – an activity that 
incorporates a system functional analysis to identify failure 
modes with estimates of the probabilities of external events 
and component failures, to quantify failure probability. The 
probabilistic risk assessment process starts with an 
identification of sequence initiating events, computation of 
the probabilities of reaching different final systems states 
given these initiating events, and the evaluation of the 
consequences of different degrees of system failure. 
Common methodologies include Fault Tree/Event Tree 
modeling and System Simulation (Monte Carlo techniques). 
The results of a PRA are often represented by a probability 
distribution of different potential system states (i.e., a risk 
curve) based on best estimates of the model and parameter 
values.  
Problem Failure Reports – a report documenting non-
conformances, failures, or anomalies, that have been detected 
during inspection or testing. Depending on the impact to the 
project, the documented condition may be a project risk, or 
issue. 
Monthly status reports (external) – reports from partners, 
contractors, etc. that provide the current status of the work 
and the achieved progress during the reporting period. Risk 
and issues are required content and flow into the project RM 
process. 
Budget Estimates – the budget estimate establishes the cost 
constraint for the project. As the project is developed, budget 
challenges will become risks, and budget reserves will bound 
risk mitigation options.  
Schedule Reviews – the project schedule establishes the time 
constraint for the project. Risks that will delay project 
progress are identified in routine project schedule reviews 
and major milestone reviews. 
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Table 3- Importance of Risk Processes and 
Methodologies 
 Average Minimum Maximum 
Trade Studies 4.3 3 5 
Technical Peer 
Reviews 
4.2 3 5 
Risk 
Brainstorming 
Sessions 
4.1 2 5 
Schedule Reviews 4.0 2 5 
Meeting 
Discussions 
3.9 2 5 
Problem Failure 
Reports 
3.9 3 5 
Forward Thinking 
Mindset 
3.9 1 5 
Monthly Status 
Reports 
3.8 2 5 
Budget Estimates 3.6 2 5 
Safety/Hazard 
Analyses 
3.3 1 5 
Reliability 
Analyses 
3.1 1 5 
Independent 
Project Reviews 
3.0 1 5 
Probabilistic Risk 
Assessments 
2.7 1 4 
 
Meeting discussions – during the course of routine project 
meeting discussions, risks are often identified. These risks 
should be considered for entry into the project risk register 
for formal tracking and mitigation. 
Forward Thinking mindset – it is important that project 
leadership has a constant focus on what still needs to happen, 
and the challenges associated with those pending activities. 
Since the NASA workforce it typically made up of 
individuals with a forte of problem-solving, it is often a 
challenge to get them to focus on future problems, rather than 
the “problem du jour.” 
Risk Brainstorming sessions – sessions dedicated to 
identifying risks by answering: 1) what can go wrong, 2) how 
likely is it, and 3) what are the consequences. These sessions 
could include a pre-mortem discussion in which a project 
team imagines that the project has failed, and then works 
backward to determine what could cause such a failure. These 
meetings are typically in addition to other RM meetings and 
are productive while preparing for major milestone reviews. 
We discussed these thirteen processes and methodologies 
with ten project managers at the NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center to better understand the degree with which they 
influenced the project RM process. Our intent was not to 
prove, with some level of statistical significance, that some 
processes, or methodologies, are more helpful than others, 
but rather to obtain a general understanding of how projects 
are identifying (and thinking about) risks. 
The PMs were asked to assess, on a 5-point scale, where 1 = 
not at all important, and 5 = extremely important, how 
important each process, or methodology, was for their 
project’s risk-informed decision-making process (on their 
current project, or a recent project). Table 3 illustrates the 
average PM’s assessment for each process/methodology. As 
was the case with the variance of risks being recorded by the 
projects, within our ten project managers, there was 
significant diversity of opinions (amplified by the fact that 
our sample involved many different types of projects). 
Therefore, we also report the minimum, and maximum, 
scores that each item received. 
For the purpose of discussion, we will consider the data with 
a median split, i.e., any value below the median is placed in 
the “Less Important” category, and any value above the 
median is placed in the “More Important” category. The 
median importance score for the data shown in Table 2 is 3.9. 
Several observations about the assessments include: 
 Trade studies and technical peer reviews are processes 
to closely identify and manage technical challenges that 
are occurring on a project, so it makes sense that these 
methodologies would be a useful source for identifying 
risks. 
 While not every project conducted risk brainstorming 
activities, those that did, find them to be very useful. 
Additionally, the NASA Risk Handbook [1, p. 100] 
recommends brainstorming activities as a common 
method for identifying risks. Some project managers 
stated that risk brainstorming consistently occurred 
every time their Risk Board met, making additional risk 
brainstorming meetings unnecessary.  
 The processes and methodologies that ranked around 
the median were mostly those that occurred as part of 
project implementation, such as schedule reviews and 
meeting discussions. It is interesting to note that our 
sample of PMs found schedule reviews to be more 
helpful for identifying risks than cost estimates. This 
makes sense because technical, and other challenges, 
result in schedule delays, which increases cost. 
 Independent project reviews were ranked less important 
in identifying risks. A common PM perception is that 
the value of independent project reviews is in the 
preparation for the review, i.e., a focus on the overall 
risk posture, and what risks may be missing, rather than 
the review itself. 
 Probabilistic Risk Assessments were clearly identified 
as less important than other methodologies for 
identifying risks, and we will discuss in a subsequent 
section. 
While not trying to draw strong conclusions from our small 
sample of project managers, processes and methodologies 
that, for the most part, are occurring on the project as a matter 
of routine, without the explicit purpose to identify risks (e.g., 
trade studies, schedule review, meeting discussions, and 
problem failure reports), are important sources for identifying 
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risks. Additionally, processes and methodologies that 
facilitate communication, and discussion among the team, 
and provide input from other organizational units (e.g., 
brainstorming, reviews, meeting discussions, and monthly 
status reports), were also highlighted as important for risk 
identification. 
 
 
4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE VALUE OF ANALYSIS 
In 1968, Matheson explored “The Economic Value of 
Analysis and Computation” [12]. His basic model considered 
a decision problem and several analytical procedures that 
could be used to analyze the problem. The procedures varied 
in the amount of information each could provide concerning 
uncertain parameters that affected the decision. He used value 
of information calculations to determine the economic 
benefit of each additional type of analysis. For the expected-
value (risk neutral) decision maker, the value of information 
is the difference between the expected value of the outcomes 
of the best decision alternative with, and without, the 
additional information gained from the additional analysis 
after accounting for the costs in obtaining the information. 
We use this concept to illustrate a method of thinking about 
the optimal level of risk analysis given the decisions that the 
risk analysis is going to support. We assume that the decision 
maker wants to minimize the expected value of the overall 
risk costs. In what follows, we assume that the decision 
maker is risk neutral. 
Risk analysis methods are evaluated here based on four 
characteristics:  
 the ability to detect potential problems before they 
occur, 
 the capability to support more effective corrective 
actions, such as mitigating the consequences over and 
above what would normally occur,  
 the costs of the analysis method, of corrective actions, 
and of undetected problems, and 
 the cost savings if earlier detection of problems can 
occur. 
Figure 1 shows an influence diagram that depicts the 
relationships among the factors needed to quantify the value 
of different analyses. Circles represent uncertainties, and 
squares are decisions that are made. The rounded rectangle is 
the measurable outcome, and in this discussion, is only 
measured in terms of costs. The uncertainties include:  
 the probability that a potential problem (risk) exists 
during development, 
  the likelihood of any evidence, or warning signs, of 
the potential problem, if it exists, 
  the likelihood of detecting the potential problem, 
conditional on the potential problem existing and 
any evidence, and 
 the possible outcomes of the project, conditional on 
whether or not, a potential problem exists, it is 
detected before a problem occurs, and what 
corrective actions have been taken to prevent the 
problem from occurring. 
For different risk analyses, we assume the probability of 
detection varies given the amount of evidence, or warning 
signs.  
The decisions in the model are: what risk analysis methods to 
use, and what mitigating (or corrective actions) to take if a 
problem is discovered. The value of the analysis is the 
difference between the expected project costs with the 
selected analysis, less the expected value of the project 
without the analysis (or as in the example to be described a 
more rigorous level of risk analysis versus a less rigorous 
analysis).   
In general, the results of such an analysis will be highly 
sensitive to the type of problem, the probability of detection 
of problems given the risk analysis method, and the 
probability of failure for the system given no detection of the 
problems. These should be the factors that a project manager 
considers when planning a risk management process. 
The value of a particular risk management process can be 
estimated by the difference between the expected costs of the 
outcomes of the best decisions based on the analysis and the 
expected value of the risk costs for the system that would be 
constructed otherwise. The identification of the optimal 
choice of risk analysis methodologies should be based on an 
incremental analysis of each possible methodology compared 
to the previous one based on increments of costs, and on 
increments of the probability of potential problem detection. 
This implies that one should be willing to spend an 
incremental cost for risk analysis if the expected benefits 
from an improved risk detection process justify the additional 
costs. If project managers are actively mitigating future 
problems routinely through project risk management, the cost 
savings should not only offset the risk management costs, but 
have the potential to provide additional margin for “Black 
Swans.” 
Illustration of Approach 
Assume that for the development of a project, the manager 
believes that there is a 10% probability that a significant 
problem exists that has yet to be detected. The PM is trying 
to choose the best level of investment in a risk management 
process. The choices are a minimalist approach, which will 
add $15,000 to the cost of the project, versus an aggressive 
approach which will add $100,000 to the cost of the project. 
The full decision tree for this illustration is divided into 
Figures 2-4; Figure 2 shows the two choices available for risk 
management, Figure 3 shows the top branch of the decision 
tree. 
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Figure 1- Influence Diagram for Quantifying the Value of Analysis 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – Illustration of Analysis of Value of Analysis 
 
 
 
Table 4- Sensitivity Analysis of Probability of Initial 
Problem 
Probability 
of Initial 
Problem 
Minimalist 
Risk 
Management 
Approach 
Aggressive 
Risk 
Management 
Approach 
Value of 
Enhanced 
Risk 
Management 
Approach 
1% $56,550 $126,950 -$70,400 
5% $222,750 $234,750 -$12,000 
10% $430,500 $369,500 $61,000 
20% $846,000 $639,000 $207,000 
30% $1,261,500 $908,500 $353,000 
 
Given that the choice is the minimalist risk approach, Figure 
3 shows the probabilities of (1) warning signals to the 
problem being available, (2) detecting the problem earlier, or 
later, given the risk management approach, and (3) project 
failure given detection and corrective action with, and 
without, detection. Figure 4 shows the corresponding 
probabilities for the aggressive risk management approach. 
In both branches, assume corrective actions cost $500,000 if 
the problem is found early, and $1,000,000 if the problem is 
found later. Also assume that if “failure” occurs, the cost to 
the project is $10,000,000. In the example, the expected cost 
of the minimalist risk management alternative is $430,500, 
and the expected cost of the aggressive risk management 
alternative is $369,500 (see Figure 2), an expected value 
savings of $61,000 after inclusion of the different costs of the 
two risk management processes. This difference comes from 
the fact that for the same initial design, the aggressive risk 
management process is detecting and correcting the problem 
more efficiently than the additional costs of the process. 
Therefore, in this illustration, the decision-maker should 
choose the more aggressive risk management process, and the 
expected value of the analysis is a cost savings of $61,000. 
This savings, however, is highly sensitive to the probabilities 
and costs assumed in the illustration. For example, Table 4 
shows the savings (or lack thereof) if the probability of an 
initial undetected problem varies between 1% and 30%. For 
the lesser probabilities, if there are not problems to be found, 
the more aggressive risk management process does not have 
value, but as the likelihood of problems increases, the value 
of the more aggressive process increases. 
In summary, a value of analysis calculation can provide 
important information in deciding the appropriate level of 
risk analysis, and management, to perform for a project and 
the approximate resources that should be allocated to the 
process, or analysis. In deciding on the appropriate level of 
analysis, the relevant factors include: 
 the type of decision 
 the data already available 
 the level of uncertainty 
 the risk attitude of the decision maker 
 the costs of the mission and of the proposed 
analysis 
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Figure 3- Example: Branch for the Minimum Risk Management Process 
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Figure 4 - Example: Branch for the Aggressive Risk Management Process 
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The illustration described demonstrates the type of thoughts 
that should be used to consider the value of investing 
additional resources in a more aggressive risk management 
process. In reality, the baseline risk in the GSFC project 
environment is very high, particularly since the technical 
challenges are routinely extreme. Given the factors to 
consider, logic dictates that an aggressive approach to risk 
management should be adopted for all projects, unless 
otherwise justified. 
5. PROBABILISTIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
Of the 13 RM processes and methodologies listed in Table 3, 
generally, the most costly is the PRA; consequently, it is 
typically only performed on large budget, high-visibility 
projects. More commonly, less-costly, similar, analyses are 
performed on projects with smaller budgets, sometimes 
referred to as “lower-case PRAs” (pra).  
Probabilistic risk assessment is a group of techniques that 
incorporate variability and uncertainty into risk assessments 
[13, 14, 15]. PRA can be used to support decision risk 
management by clearly characterizing the impacts of 
uncertainties on potential decision alternatives.  
The alternative to a PRA is a risk assessment with a single 
point estimate of risk (pra), and usually some brief qualitative 
descriptions of uncertainty. The PRA on the other hand does 
not generate a single point estimate, but rather produces a 
probability distribution of the range of consequences that 
could occur, providing more information to decision makers 
[13, 14, 15]. 
PRA approaches will tend to be more data intensive than non-
PRA approaches, and thus will require additional time, 
financial, and analytic resources to obtain the needed 
probabilistic input data for each aspect of the risk assessment, 
and for aggregating the input data into a full characterization 
of the uncertainty of the system. As more projects incorporate 
probabilistic designs in risk assessment, and an organization 
gains more experience, the costs of PRA (relative to other 
methods) could decline.  
We will not repeat the procedures to perform a PRA here, 
referring the reader to NASA’s Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
Procedures Guide for NASA Managers and Practitioners 
[15]. Instead, we will focus on when PRA is most helpful, 
and what significant challenges remain in the use of PRA. 
When is a Probabilistic Risk Analysis Most Helpful 
Using the logic outlined in the previous section regarding the 
value of the analysis, we identify several important system 
factors that will likely justify the PRA effort. These include: 
- If high quality probabilistic input data are obtainable 
- If a probabilistic approach to better characterize the 
uncertainty can be accomplished in a timely manner 
- If there is a reasonable probability of major undetected 
problems, and sophisticated risk modeling are needed to 
discover these problems 
- If the uncertainty in some aspect of project is very high, 
and decisions are contentious, or have large resource 
implications, or if there is a belief that additional data 
collection would likely lead to a different decision 
- If there are major gaps in knowledge, or major 
assumptions being used in the current level of risk 
assessment that could be improved with more risk 
modeling (the risk manager must understand the major 
assumptions being made in any project risk modeling)  
- If the criticality order does not coincide with the actual 
ranking of risk contributions, (e.g., FMEA might be 
sufficient when all criticality 1 items are strong risk 
contributors and non-criticality 1 items are not, and 
therefore when problem detection in these items is the 
primary goal)  
Challenges of Probabilistic Risk Analysis 
Even if a probabilistic risk analysis is justified, there will still 
be challenges. The three most significant are: 
- Getting the needed data 
- Creating a transparent model 
- Communicating the results 
 
As described in [15], there are many sources of the needed 
data. For example, if there are applicable historical data, it 
may be straightforward to derive an uncertainty distribution, 
but the reality is that there will be few instances where there 
are enough existing applicable, and relevant, historical data. 
In those cases, data from subject matter experts may be the 
only option. For example, a critical decision on ICESat-2 
needed to be made after the failure of an instrument laser late 
in the project lifecycle. While the instrument has two lasers, 
and only one needs to be functioning (i.e., the second is a 
back-up), once the first one failed during development, it was 
considered a serious possibility that the second one would do 
the same. But without substantial past failure data for this 
unique laser, how likely is something if it is a “serious 
possibility”? In 1951, Sherman Kent, working with the CIA, 
interviewed members of the Board of National Estimates and 
learned that a “serious possibility” could mean anything from 
20% to 80% depending on the person being interviewed [16]. 
Without a good way to technically derive the failure 
probabilities of the lasers, and because of the consequences if 
they did fail, the project ultimately assumed that the failure 
was likely enough to invest extra resources replacing it. 
There is value in a probabilistic risk analysis when there are 
reasonable chances of undetected problems. But consider that 
undetected problems are commonly at the interface of 
systems, and PRA models that consider all the multiple 
possible interdependent component interfaces could become 
a very complex model, very quickly. PRA models that are too 
complex are less valuable. For example, the National 
Academy of Sciences criticized a PRA developed by the 
Department of Homeland Security called the Biological 
Threat Risk Assessment (BTRA). The National Academy 
report criticized the BTRA as having “great complexity, 
which requires many more SME (Subject Matter Expert) 
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estimates than can be supported by the limited base of 
knowledge about biological terrorism. It also precludes 
transparency, adequate sensitivity analysis, and validation” 
[17].  
The third challenge, the dissemination of a statistical 
distribution, or probability output number, should be 
considered carefully given the quality, and coverage, of the 
input data. A PRA model that has been created with 
probabilistic input data, that was not high quality, could lead 
the decision maker to a false sense of confidence, or costly, 
unnecessary “corrective action.” One output of a PRA model 
should be a clear characterization of how confident decision 
makers should be in their choices, based on the analysis (i.e., 
how uncertain is the uncertainty?). 
Also, research has shown that the ability of decision makers 
to deal with concepts of probability, and uncertainty, varies. 
For example, Krupnick et al. [18] concluded that most people 
have difficulty understanding information on uncertainty 
with conventional scientific presentation approaches. This 
study highlighted the need for practical strategies for the 
communication of PRA results and uncertainty information 
between risk analysts, decision makers, and other 
stakeholders.  
Finally, PRA models can be problematic, just like any 
analysis. Poorly performed PRA models could result in worse 
decisions if the probabilistic data used in quantification have 
significant errors. For example, if the relative criticality of 
different scenarios is misstated, then resources could be 
diverted from the prevention of more likely scenarios, to 
prevention of less likely ones. If the overall risk is overstated, 
or understated, this would distort the priorities for different 
prevention measures. Also, the absolute benefit of any given 
prevention measure could be in error. All of these issues can 
misinform the decision maker. 
While the optimal level of quantitative analysis should be 
determined for a specific mission, in general, PRA is needed 
when decisions need to be made that involve high stakes in a 
complex situation, as in a high-hazard mission with critical 
functions being performed by complex systems, and where 
high quality input data are available. Being able to carefully 
manage project resources requires good risk models, and 
allocating project resources to further uncertainties needs to 
be informed by insight into which uncertainties’ resolution 
offers the greatest benefit.  
Parallels to Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level 
Analysis 
While the previous section focused on benefits and 
challenges to PRA, similar benefits and challenges are also 
generally present in NASA’s Joint Cost and Schedule 
Confidence Level (JCL) analysis. The goal of a JCL is to 
identify the probability that a given project cost will be equal 
to, or less than, some defined cost level, and that the schedule 
will be equal to, or earlier than, a specific date [19]. In order 
to produce an accurate JCL, analysts must understand where 
significant project risks exist and be able to model uncertainty 
using current, and historical, data. These significant risks 
need to be included as uncertain impacts in the schedule, 
which, when realized, impact the cost estimates [19]. Similar 
to PRAs, JCLs have a challenge with data. For example, the 
NASA guidance for JCL states, “[u]nfortunately, it is rarely 
the case that data exist to justify all the uncertainty 
distributions required for JCL analysis” [19, p. 34]. 
Additionally, even if the challenge of accurately identifying 
risks with probability distributions is disregarded, it is 
“nearly impossible to predict the time and budget required to 
complete many aspects of NASA projects” [19, p. 15]. 
Similar to PRA, while there are challenges with JCL, in most 
cases, the benefits of the additional insight are worth the 
costs. Analysts and projects must invest time and thought in 
developing credible, and appropriate, models that clearly 
characterize the uncertainty in the models. Additionally, the 
models need to be used by decision makers based on the 
strengths of the model; in particular, its ability to facilitate 
communication within the project, and with external 
stakeholders. 
 
6. BEST PRACTICES 
In conclusion, we provide a few insights from observed best 
practices. 
1 - A good risk management process should reduce work load 
if potential problems are avoided, or at least identified early. 
The resources invested in a rigorous risk management 
process should pay for themselves by avoiding problems, or 
at least detecting them earlier in the project life cycle. 
As demonstrated in the illustration described in Table 4, an 
effective risk management process, that can detect potential 
problems, can have genuine benefits in terms of a reduction 
in project’s expected costs. Additionally, some of these 
expected benefits may arise from avoiding an inappropriate 
escalation of commitment as a project nears completion. 
2 - The majority of a project’s risks do not require complex 
analysis to identify, and the process will undoubtedly reap 
benefits from the communication.  
Several project managers that we talked with had significant 
project risks that did not require complex analyses to detect, 
e.g., working with liquid methane, planning a satellite 
servicing mission for a more than twenty year old satellite, 
etc. Even when the risks were significant, and obvious, 
project managers praised the communication that risk 
methodologies and processes can provide, as critical for 
mission success. 
3 - An effective risk management process will bolster 
communication with external partners, especially 
international partners. 
Echoing the previous insight, that risk processes are 
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important for the communication they facilitate, this was 
particularly true on a recent mission partnering with the 
Japanese Space Agency (JAXA). The risk management 
process provided an opportunity to overcome different 
cultural approaches to project management that may have 
existed between the US and Japanese partners. The Japanese 
partners saw the opportunity to seek more detail on risks 
appearing at the interfaces. 
4 – The best Risk Boards will have psychological safety and 
accountability.  
With hindsight, the environment on failed projects, or 
missions, are often described as lacking in “psychological 
safety” [7]. Roberto [7, p. 144] describes psychological safety 
as “team members do not believe that the group will not 
rebuke, marginalize, or penalize individuals for speaking up 
and challenging prevailing opinions”. At a project 
management forum at Marshall Space Flight Center, that two 
of the authors attended several years ago, there was concern 
expressed for how the culture on the Space Shuttle Program 
around 2000-2002 (just prior to the Columbia Accident) was 
such that anomalies needed to be handled by individuals, and 
not reported in tracking systems, since reported anomalies 
could be detrimental to the space shuttle program staying on 
its launch schedule. Risk Boards must be forums for open 
communication about potential problems. This will only 
occur in an environment with strong psychological safety. 
Additionally, research has shown that when a person is 
accountable for his, or her, behavior to a legitimate, 
reasonably well-informed audience, whose views are 
unknown, and who is interested in accuracy, he (or she) will 
engage in more effortful thought and more self-critical, 
qualified judgments [20, 21]. Thus, accountability in Risk 
Boards should enhance the communication, problem 
solving/avoidance, and the application of all relevant 
information. 
5 – Project Risk Boards would benefit from best practice 
formal guidance. 
The insights that we gained from our discussions with a small 
sample of project managers further emphasized the different 
approaches that projects take when implementing risk 
management processes (see for example the spread between 
minimum and maximum importance scores for the various 
methodologies described in Table 3). We recommend more 
detailed guidance be developed based on best practices, e.g., 
for how often Risk Boards should meet, what is a quorum for 
a risk board, what should happen at a Risk Board, should 
minutes be kept, etc. 
NASA takes risk management very seriously, and for most 
projects the risk management process is exemplar. Lessons 
from these stellar projects should be captured and 
institutionalized for all projects. This paper is just a small step 
in that process. 
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